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Proprietary Rights in
Digital Data
The future of copyright and contract law
in a networked world.
By Maureen A.

he Clinton Administration
in 1993 announced its intention to develop a National
; Information Infrastructure (NII), an
"information superhighway" designed
to make electronic digital information
more widely available and accessible to
7 the public. 1 This announcement has
.

~

stimulated a national debate over how

best to define and enforce an appropriate set of proprietary rights in digital information. That debate should begin with an analysis
and assessment of the current state of the law
of digital data. While that law resembles a moving target,2 general trends may be identified.
The current framework provides the background against which NIL may be tailored to
realize its objective of disseminating a broad
range of information to all at affordable prices
while still maintaining the protection of intel3
lectual property rights in that information.
This article summarizes the current state of
copyright protection for data flowing on networks and in on-line fact-based computer
databases and proceeds to identify those issues
which need to be addressed before NII's fullscale implementation.
Copyright Protection and
Digital Data

The

success of NII in achieving its goals
rests, at least in part, on technological
and legal considerations. As a technical matter, communications technology must
permit the connection of distant users and information in a manner that will deliver that information at a time and in a format meaning-
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ful to the user. As a legal matter, the willingness of providers to make their data available
at a price which is not prohibitive-a fundamental premise of the NII-critically depends
on their ability to appropriate returns on their
investments in developing and maintaining
that data through some legal mechanism, such
as federal intellectual property rights or state
enforcement of contract rights.
Currently, the technology exists to link millions of users through the loosely structured,
but vast Internet.4 The High Performance
Computing Act of 1991 authorized construction of the National Research and Education
Network (NREN) to build on the Internet.5 It
seems likely then that NII, in its turn, will retain at least some vestiges of the Internet
model.
The Internet
The Internet is simply a collection of networks-a "network of networks"-linked together by a communications protocol. It grew
out of a project sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and Department of
Defense (DOD), beginning primarily as a
medium for electronic mail (e-mail) and bulletin board (or newsgroup) exchanges. The Internet has since evolved into a means for facilitating publication of electronic journals and
accessing a wide variety of information, including databases physically remote from the particular user.6
Administration of the network is fairly decentralized. Generally, host sites pay a fee to
connect to the Internet7 and often establish an
ethics policy to guide their users.' From a legal
perspective, the Internet model has relied

more on informal dispute resolution
than the court system,9 perhaps because the network grew up among a
relatively insular group- the research community-as a means to circulate scholarly work for comment.
This use of informal norms is unlikely to continue as traffic on the Internet increases and commercial, i.e.,
royalty-bearing, data is introduced,1 "
and is unlikely to characterize the operation of NII, which is planned to
have a large commercial presence."
Recent caselaw suggests that most
data traveling over the Internet is
protected by copyright, with the
scope of protection varying with the
type of data. Providers will continue
to buttress copyright protection with
contract, particularly to protect rights
in on-line fact-based databases and to
deal with hypertext and other evolving technologies that ease the manipulating and copying of data. In framing the NIL against this backdrop,
Congress will be forced to address
some difficult questions, such as the
appropriate level of protection for
on-line fact-based databases and the
enforceability of contracts between
users and providers that effectively
nullify the fair use provisions of the
Copyright Act. Essentially, Congress
must consider whether the copyright
paradigm, which, in the hard-copy
world, strikes a balance between the
rights of authors and the public, can
be transplanted into the electronic
world, or whether adjustments are
needed to prevent copyright from becoming a barrier to achieving the
goals of NIL.
Copyright Protection and the
Internet1"
enerally, copyright protection
inheres in "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . ." but
does not extend to "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.
.3Thus, the primary requirements for protection are originality,
fixation, and that the work be one of

authorship. Most materials which
would traditionally be considered
"copyrightable" should meet these requirements even when recorded only
in digital form. The scope of copyright protection may vary, however,
depending on the type of data.
Originality
The requirement of originality,
with one important exception, may
be the one most easily met by most
data stored in digital form. Constitutional in nature, the originality requirement is not stringent, mandating only that the work be independently created by the author and possess some minimal degree of creativity. 4 E-mail, bulletin board postings,
and electronic journals would seem
to qualify, as long as the contents of
the communications originate with
their authors.
On-line fact-based databases are
likely to have a more difficult time
because many factual databases are
just that-factual in nature-containing only raw facts which are not copyrightable, rather than original written
expression, which is.' 5 A factual
database may be protected by copyright however, as a compilation, with
copyright subsisting not in the data itself, but in the author's original data
selection, arrangement, and ordering.' 6 This approach is likely to present a substantial hurdle to copyright
protection for many on-line factbased commercial databases which
derive their value not from selectivity
and arrangement, but rather from
standard, easy-to-use formats, comprehensiveness, and timeliness of delivery.' 7 In particular, since the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service

Co.,'" the originality requirement has
effectively served to limit the copyright protection extended to factbased compilations. The Feist doctrine is thus also likely to limit the
copyright protection for on-line factbased databases, which are essentially
electronic versions of their hardcopy
counterparts.' 9

Fixation
At first glance, the fixation rec-uirement seems to present difficulty as
digital data, if fixed at all, may reside
solely on disk. The data on disk is imperceptible to the human eye and
subject to destruction through electrical or mechanical failure or the intentional act of erasure. However, the
Copyright Act defines fixation broadly, stating that "[a] work is fixed in a
tangible medium of expression when
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of
the author, is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are
being transmitted, is 'fixed' for the
purposes of this title if a fixation of the
work is being made simultaneously
with its transmission."2 In turn, copies
are defined as "material objects ...

in

which a work is fixed by any method
now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. " 21 These definitions, along with
evidence of congressional intent in
2
22
the legislative history and caselaw, 3
demonstrate that disk storage should
meet the fixation requirement as it is
sufficiently stable to permit the data
to be perceived through the aid of
the computer and its software.
Electronic journals and on-line
databases are memorialized not only
on disk storage but also in conventional hard copy form, thus easily
meeting the fixation requirement.
The result is less clear with respect to
such transient types of data as e-mail
and bulletin board exchanges, which
may be fixed, if at all, briefly in the
computer's random access memory
(RAM), a volatile medium.24 In many,

if not most, instances, the sender of email or a bulletin board posting
keeps a copy for himself on disk, albeit with the exact physical location
of the data probably determined by a
system administrator. Thus, the disk
Federal Bar News &Journal

storage should comfortably fit within
the fixation definition.
More interesting questions arise
when the user/author does not intend to keep a copy of the communication. The user may compose a note
or message on the screen without saving to the disk, so storage is only in
RAM and then either sent directly to
the receiving network or to a temporary disk holding area-a mail spool
-for transmission . After transmission, the data in both RAM and the
mail spool is overwritten by other outgoing and incoming communications.
MA Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc.26 suggests that even with no disk,
tape, or paper record of the message,
the author of the communication will
not be barred from a claim of copyright. In MAI, the court held that a
"copy" for purposes of the Copyright
Act is made when a computer program is transferred from a permanent storage device to RAM. 27 Despite

its volatile nature, the court held that
the representation of the program in
RAM met statutory fixation requirements, at least in part, because Peak
was able to load MAI's software and
28
use it to diagnose a system problem.
The holding seems broad enough to
stand for the proposition that e-mail,
bulletin board postings and perhaps
even on-line "chat" messages that reside solely in RAM or temporarily in a
mail spool may be considered fixed
29
for purposes of the Copyright Act.

MA!'s practical impact may be minimal. In most instances, the sender
keeps a copy on disk. Moreover, the
recipient system usually stores e-mail
type communications on disk for
more than a transitory period while
waiting for the addressee to open it.
Because this storage is a direct result
of the sender's action in transmitting
the data, it may meet the fixation requirement even without reliance on
MAIs somewhat expansive definition
of "copy."3"
Works of Authorship
Most data stored in digital form
should meet the "work of authorship"
requirement under the Copyright
August 1994/Volume 41, No. 7

Act. The act divides works of authorship into eight statutory subject matter categories, with the exclusive
rights afforded a particular work de1
pendent on its characterization.
Most textual data-e-mail, bulletin
board postings, electronic journals,
and on-line databases-should fit easily within the expansive statutory definition of "literary work," 2 and, in
fact, the act's legislative history expressly notes that "literary works" includes databases. 3 Caselaw has followed this interpretation. 4
More difficult questions of categorization arise with mixed-media
works-those that combine data
falling into more than one statutory
category. For example, multimedia
works often include both text ("literary work") and audio and video ("audiovisual work"). Whether such mixed
works are protected by copyright is unclear. If they are protected, under
what subject matter heading(s) is also
unclear. Because the statutory language speaks by way of example rather
than limitation, 5 and the legislative
history indicates an intent to accommodate new developments,3 6 mixedmedia works seem likely to be considered statutory subject matter with or
without legislation expressly providing
37
for their copyright eligibil-ity
In summary, most data stored in
digital form are likely to meet the
statutory requirements for copyright,
although some issues remain, including the extent of protection for transitory data stored only in volatile
RAM and the treatment of mixed
media works. Additionally, the scope
of protection for on-line fact-based
databases is likely to be quite limited
in the wake of Feist.
The Copyright Model:
Does it make Sense for
Digital Data?
hat copyright is likely to inhere in digital data is only a
first step in the analysis. The
availability of copyright or its lack
must be evaluated to determine
whether the grant or exclusion and

concomitant rights 8 and remedies
meet the reasonable expectations of
both users and providers of the
data. ° Analysis suggests that while the
copyright model remains viable in
the digital world, certain changes or
clarifications may be helpful to allow
providers and users better to understand the scope of protection for online fact-based databases, as well as
under what circumstances the copyright law will preempt the terms of
user-provider contracts.
ElectronicMail
Under copyright law, e-mail is likely
to be compared to a letter. Generally,
the sender considers the message private, intended only for its addressee
and others copied on it. The sender
does not expect the addressee to
copy and distribute the message to
others. Receivers of e-mail, in turn,
expect to reply by forwarding the
original e-mail back to the ,sender
(copying other recipients of the original communication) with their comments appended or interspersed with
the original text. Addressees may also
want to download the e-mail to disk
permanent storage and/or print out
a hard copy record. Conventional
copyright theory should protect the
expectations of both the sender and
recipient.
Letters meeting the statutory requirements are entitled to copyright
protection, with the author retaining
ownership of the copyright and the
recipient obtaining ownership of the
tangible physical property.4° The recipient may keep the letter, destroy it,
transfer its possession to another, or,
in certain circumstances, permit its
limited inspection by others.4' The
author retains exclusive rights, including the rights to permit or prevent the copying and preparation of
42
derivative works of the letter.
The conduct of the e-mail recipient in forwarding the note back to
the sender, and in downloading
and/or printing it would seem to violate the copyright owner's exclusive
right to reproduce the copyrighted
work.43 The act of adding or inter-

spersing comments in reply would
seem to violate the copyright owner's
exclusive right to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted
work." However, this conduct may be
governed under either the doctrine
of implied license or fair use.
Although the Copyright Act generally mandates a written agreement to
transfer ownership of copyright or to
grant an exclusive license, the same
requirement does not apply to
nonexclusive licenses. 45 A nonexclusive license may be granted orally or
implied from conduct. A license may
be implied because the sender of email knows that a reply from the addressee is likely to be forthcoming
and is likely to be sent to all of the
original parties and that the addressee is likely to store the original
e-mail and/or print it out for his
records. In transmitting the e-mail,
the sender grants an implied license
to the addressee to reply by attaching
the reply to the original communication and including comments within
it4" and to download and print it for
47
personal use.
A more conventional line of defense to insulate the actions of the addressee in reply is set forth in section
107 of the Copyright Act-the fair use
defense. Fair use is an equitable doctrine that avoids rigid application of
the copyright laws when such application would stifle the very creativity
that the copyright laws are designed
to foster.48 Section 107 sets forth four
nonexclusive factors to be considered
in a fair use inquiry: (1) the purpose
and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work. Recent
court decisions emphasize the necessity of weighing all four factors in light
of the statutory purpose.4' In the case
of e-mail, the note is likely to be a creative work and addressees engage in

wholesale copying of it in reply. Still,
however, because replying and downloading and/or printing the note is
non-commercial in nature and within
the expectations of the copyright
owner in this medium,50 such conduct

should be excused by fair use.
What then, would constitute infringement of an author's copyright
on his e-mail? Forwarding the document widely to users un-named on
the original mail and/or printing it
out and circulating copies would
seem to be an infringement. Today,
such conduct, while perhaps not explicitly termed "copyright infringement," would be regarded as a
51
breach of manners on the Internet.
Bulletin Board Postings
Copyright protection for e-mail fits
with the expectations of both the
providers and users of the data regarding permitted and prohibited actions. Electronic bulletin board postings, however, are different in kind
from e-mail; one posting to a bulletin
board (the poster) expects a wide audience for his message, i.e., all who
have subscribed to the particular
topic. Electronic bulletin boards are
characterized by continual comment
on a particular topic with later postings building on and often incorporating the thoughts (and text) of earlier ones. The process is somewhat
akin to an author sending a manuscript for review to a number of people with each returning comments
and suggestions. In the electronic
context, however, the exchange of
commentary is often conducted on
general topics of interest as well as
draft publications and each subscriber is able to view the comments

of all other subscribers.
Thus, the poster expects the sub-

mission to be circulated among other
subscribers and for those other subscribers to comment, perhaps incorporating the original in the com-

ment. The subscriber expects to
download or print out the posting for

ease in reading and sharing with
other non-subscribers interested in
the topic. Generally, copyright law in

its current form should protect most
of these expectations, and prohibit
conduct which may be outside the
boundary of acceptable "netiquette."
Because the poster knows that the
posting will be circulated to others on
the subscription list, the poster has
authorized those copies.52 The subscriber's act of forwarding the posting to other subscribers while commenting on it, downloading, and
printing it for personal use should be
protected under an implied license
or fair use inquiry." Less clear is
whether a subscriber may re-transmit
documents in hard or soft copy form
to non-subscribers.
The implied license and fair use inquiries would be closer, and the transmission more likely to survive challenge, if there were no commercial
purpose involved, i.e, no fee was associated with the document and the
non-subscriber used it for comment,
criticism, or research.54 Infringement
would probably be found if a subscriber forwarded the document or
comments of another to a large number of non-subscribers; infringement
would almost certainly obtain if a subscriber commercially exploited the
protected expression of another.
Today, such conduct, while not explicitly termed "copyright infringement," would be regarded as a
breach of manners on the Internet.
In both the e-mail and bulletin
board context, interesting questions
arise when the original transmission
was not authorized-that is when the
e-mail sender or bulletin board
poster does not have rights to the underlying material transmitted. In
Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Frena (PEI),

the court specifically rejected a fair
use defense and found that the operator of a subscription bulletin board
violated Playboy's exclusive rights to
display and distribute its photos publicly when the operator made Playboy
photos, uploaded by a subscriber,
available through its bulletin board.
This finding was made despite the defendant operator's lack of knowledge
of the infringement.56 Similar cases
are pending.5"
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This trend suggests that while copyright'should protect the range of expected uses of most subscribers, the
move from the Internet research and
education model to the NII commercial model may have a chilling effect
on the data available for access to NII
subscribers in the first instance. That
is, if the operator of a bulletin board
may be accountable for copyright infringement because a subscriber uploads copyrighted material without
authorization from the copyright
owner, it may substantially limit the
data uploaded and disseminated to
others.
Some service providers are already
following this path. For example, the
America On-Line (AOL) terms of service provide that anyone posting information in message board areas
consents to the placement of that material in the public domain and the
placement of copyrighted material in
any public posting area without the
consent of the copyright owner violates the terms of service.5" While the
public domain is an extensive and important source of ideas,59 a great deal
of information is conveyed through
copyrighted works which, by the
terms of the license, will no longer be
accessible through AOL's bulletin
board.
Someone should bear responsibility for the unauthorized uploading
and distribution of copyrighted materials. PEI would have been regarded
as an unremarkable, garden-variety
infringement case if the subscriber
had bought a copy of the magazine,
photocopied the photographs, and
distributed them. The same conduct
should be infringement when it occurs in the electronic context. PEIs
chilling effect on the willingness of
bulletin board operators to accept
data may be balanced by an increase
in creativity of authors who now know
that their copyright rights will be
meaningfully enforced, even in an
electronic context. Perhaps the cause
of action should be limited to one
against the actual wrongdoer, rather
than against the operator of the service merely providing the facility and
August 1994/Volume 41, No. 7

without knowledge of the infringement. It is questionable whether this
limited remedy would be sufficient
for the copyright owner, who prefers
recovery from the deep-pocket, the
bulletin board operator.
In formulating NII policy, Congress
should be more concerned about the
statutory "gate" that discourages uploading information to the system
than with the copyright protection,
once the data is available to subscribers. Congress should consider
how best to assign liability for infringement, striking the appropriate
balance between the exclusive rights
of the author and the public benefit.
Finally, the public must be educated
about permitted and prohibited activities, and Congress or industry should
consider establishing a clearing
house organization to reduce the
transaction costs of those seeking
copyright permission to make data
60
available electronically.
ElectronicJournals
The electronic journal presents
similar problems. In this context,
however, the publisher should be
aware of the copyright law and able
to obtain permission to distribute
copyrighted materials more easily
than the consumer subscriber to the
electronic bulletin board. Electronic
journals are analogous to such hard
copy publications as magazines and
books, and the copyright law applicable in that context represents a reasonable approximation of the expectations of both providers and subscribers. Many subscribers use an
electronic journal the same way as a
hard copy journal, expecting only to
be able to read the document and,
perhaps, to download it to disk
and/or print it out for ease in reading. Doctrines of implied license and
fair use should shelter this activity as
they shelter e-mail and bulletin board
postings.6
It is more difficult to determine
whether many users will edit and/or
forward an electronic journal to
other, non-subscribers. In the Internet context, forwarding the informa-

tion without modification might be
approved under copyright law because the data available to Internet
subscribers is available free of charge
and all users on the Internet have access to the same information through
the gopher and World Wide Web facilities.6 2 Thus, forwarding a journal
accessible on the Internet might not
constitute a copyright infringement
because all users can access it without
charge. The copyright owner should
be aware of this when placing documents on the network.
In a commercial context, the same
result is unlikely. Subscribers are paying customers of the publisher just as
are customers in bookstores. The
magazine publisher would neither expect nor approve of wholesale copying and distribution by customers
and nor would the publisher of the
electronic journal. Conventional
copyright law should protect both
publishers.63
Similar to other digital data, electronic journals may easily be copied,
manipulated, and transmitted to others. The problem is more acute with
electronic journals because the underlying works are likely to be of
higher value and subject to higher
risk of misappropriation than in the
e-mail and bulletin board context.
Thus, while the copyright law may
seem reasonably in accord with the
expectations of the journal publisher
and subscriber, if the publisher is unable to detect unauthorized copying,
the publisher may be unwilling to distribute the journal in soft copy
form.64
The problem is compounded by
hypertext capabilities, which allow
subscribers to take pieces of the journal and incorporate them into their
own documents.
In an attempt to encourage electronic publishing, solutions have
been proposed.6 5 These solutions
move away from the traditional copyright focus on an exclusive rights system in which the purchaser of a copy
is free to use it subject only to the
copyright owner's exclusive rights, to
a contract law focus, in which a price

is attached to each permitted use.66
For example, a user may extract parts
of a copyrighted work for use in a
document in return for payment of a
fee that is automatically assessed by
the software monitoring permitted
uses.

67

In a system like this, however, the
copyright concept of fair use is a nullity. The publisher would find it difficult to monitor the subscriber's end
use to determine whether it falls into
a traditional category sheltered by
the fair use doctrine. 68 Thus, the

copyright owner receives a royalty,
even if the subscriber's use of the information would be permitted without fee under the Copyright Act's fair
use provisions.
The question arises whether these
private contractual arrangements
should be enforced or preempted by
section 301 of the Copyright Act.
Generally, section 301 preempts state
law, which creates "legal or equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright ...

in works of

authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright
as specified by sections 102 and 103..
."

This doctrine applies in cases in

which the elements for a cause of action are identical to those alleged in a
copyright infringement case.6 9 Actions for breach of contract are generally not preempted by the act.7 In
this case, section 301 would not apply
because the conduct breaching the license agreement would be failure to
pay a royalty, a breach of promise that
is not an element that proves copyright infringement.
Even if statutory preemption does
not apply, state law enforcement of
the contract may still be preempted if
it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."7 Generally,
the grant of exclusive copyright rights
is viewed as a means to the objective
of advancing the public welfare by increasing creative activity. Exclusive
rights are, however, a second-best solution because even a statutory

monopoly introduces market imperfections.72 To adjust for those imperfections, the fair use provision of the
Copyright Act encourages others to
build freely on another's work in circumstances when: (1) transaction
costs are such that it is unlikely that
the copyright owner and the copier
would be able to reach a licensing
agreement; and (2) the particular activity in which the copier is engaging
is likely to redound to the public benefit without unduly impacting the incentive of authors to create.7" The
fair use provision strikes a balance between the rights of authors and the
public. A court might set aside a licensing scheme that frustrates the
overall statutory scheme of the Copyright Act by eliminating fair use.
In formulating its NII policy,
Congress should determine to what
extent publishers and subscribers
may contract around fair use. In deciding the boundary between copyright and contract, Congress may
consider that because the publisher
bears no obligation to make its journal available in the first instance, it
should, within limits, be allowed to
condition that availability. Payments
to the publisher are as likely to reflect
the value of the ease of use and timeliness of delivery inherent in an electronic medium as a charge for use of
the data itself. Usage merely serves as
a convenient metering device. The
traditional justification for fair use as
a means to overcome the transaction
costs of licensing when the copier's
activity is likely to redound to the
public benefit is missing in the electronic

context.

74

The impact on pub-

lishers' incentives if such contracts
are preempted may be large. Failure
to provide some means for publishers
to appropriate a return on their investment is likely to discourage them
from making publications available in
an electronic forum. The issue may
not be whether protection should be
available, but rather its form.
Congress should proceed slowly, reserving final judgment until reliable
data on the extent of the problem are
generated.

On-Line Fact-Based Databases
The same copyright preemption
problem arises with on-line fact-based
databases. The same considerations
regarding ease of copying, distribution, and manipulation of data that
are likely to lead journal publishers
to adapt approaches to monitor and
charge for a subscriber's use apply.
However, the copyright protection afforded the two types of data differs.
Electronic journals are likely to be afforded the full scope of copyright
protection, while on-line fact-based
databases are protected by copyright,
if at all, as a compilation, a much
"thinner" scope of protection extending only to the selection, arrangement, and ordering of the data.75
Thus, while both electronic journals
and on-line fact based databases are
likely to be products of significant effort (intellectual creativity in the former; labor in collecting, organizing,
and culling the data in the latter),
copyright provides less protection for
on-line fact-based databases.7 6 Publishers have little choice but to seek
other means to appropriate a return
on their investment than reliance on
77
exclusive copyright rights.
One means is to control contractually the uses to which the subscriber
may put the data and to charge for
those uses in the same way that the
electronic journal publisher charges.
In subscriber contracts, electronic
database suppliers provide for the
private creation of copyright-type
rights and charge for uses that otherwise might be privileged under copyright law.78 While the same preemption issue regarding fair use arises in
the on-line fact-based database context as in the electronic journal context, the additional question arises of
the extent to which private parties
may agree to endow data that are not
statutorily protected by copyright
with copyright-type rights.
It is unclear whether these contracts would be subject to a section
301 preemption challenge.7 9 However, under either section 301 or a policy analysis, these contracts may have
difficulty surviving. The case for preFederal Bar News &Journal

emption is stronger here than with
electronic journals because public interest favors the free flow of factual
information. The mitigating factors
of the electronic journal context,
however, apply here, as well: the publisher is under no obligation to make
its database available and, within limits, should be allowed to condition
that availability. In the database context, the payments to the publisher
are particularly likely to reflect the
value of timely delivery as much as a
charge for use of the data itself. The
contracts, though not negotiated, are
likely to reflect the terms to which
the parties would have agreed, particularly if the database market is competitive and the parties foresee a
long-term relationship. Preemption
should perhaps be limited to those
cases in which the bargaining process
has broken down and the database
supplier's conduct may be character-

ized as fraudulent or overreaching.
Here, the expectations of providers
and users of the data may not be satisfactorily addressed through copyright,
and untrammeled freedom of contract would frustrate the copyright
scheme.80 Congress might want to
consider whether, in this context,
some different property right would
be appropriate."

W

for striking that balance in most contexts. Focus should be directed toward identifying where the copyright
model breaks down and how best to
fix it, rather than replacing that
model. E

Conclusion
hile NII has the potential

to place an unprecedented
amount of information at
the nation's fingertips, its design, including its legal arrangements, must
be thoughtfully plotted to maximize
both the quality and quantity of this
data. Congress must decide the appropriate balance between the rights
of authors and the public. The Copyright Act presents a reasonable model

ENDNOTES
'INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: AGENDA FOR ACTION

(1993) [hereinafter NII AGENDA

FOR

AC-

TION].

'SeeJosh Hyatt, Highway Robbery-The
Information Superhighway Has Not Yet
Reached Homes, But the Legal Issues it
Raises are Already Generating Traffic in the
Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 2, 1994, 3,
at 29 (summarizing recent litigation including Playboy Enterprises case (infra
text accompanying note 56) and CompuServe case, infra note 57) [hereinafter Highway Robbery] ; see also Peter
H. Lewis, Student Accused of Running
Network for Pirated Software, N.Y TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1994, at Al (MIT student
charged in piracy case for operating
bulletin board allowing distribution of
copyrighted commercial programs; student not accused of personally placing
or retrieving software on system) [hereinafter Software Piracy] ; Judy Rakowsky,
MIT Student is Called Software Piracy Plotter - U.S. Indictment Stirs Issues of Copyright Protection, First Amendment Rights,
BOSTON GLOBE,

Apr. 8, 1994, 3, at 1

(student accused not only of setting up
system enabling piracy but also of advertising availability of free software
and transmitting stolen property by interstate and international wire fraud;
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users downloaded files to anonymous
Internet address and files then forwarded to users' own computer systems, allowing users to remain anonymous)
[hereinafter MIT Student Called Software
Piracy
Plotter].
3
NII AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note
1, at 3-4 (realization of objectives
should enhance American ability to
compete in global economy). It is interesting to note that while the NIL Agenda for Action and other reports to
Congress emphasize the need for protection of intellectual property rights
and to strike the appropriate balance
between rights of copyright owners and
the public, legislative efforts in the area
have concentrated primarily on the
telecommunications industry forming
the technical backbone of the NIL. See
e.g., S. 1822, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1994) (Communications Act); S. 1086,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Telecommunications Infrastructure Act); H.R.
3636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (National Communication Competition
and Information Infrastructure Act);
work has just begun on formulating
recommendations for legislative
changes to the Copyright Act (see INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NIl: A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE WORKING GROUP
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

(July

7, 1994), which is not addresses in this
article).
4
See, e.g., Computer Networks Webbed
Fingers,THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 1994, at
86 (15 million users worldwide linked
through Internet) [hereinafter Computer Networks - Webbed Fingers]; see also
Priscilla A. Walter & Eric H. Sussman,
Protecting Commercially Developed Information on the NREN, 10 THE COMPUTER
LAw. 1, 2 (Apr. 1993) (citing N.Y TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1992, B, at 12) (estimating that
more than 15 million individuals have
used Internet in U.S. and additional 10
million internationally).
55 U.S.C. 5501-28 (1988 & Supp. IV
1993).
6
Pamela Samuelson & Robert J.
Glushko, Intellectual Property Rights for
Digital Library and Hypertext Publishing
Systems, 6 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 237, 24345 (1993) [hereinafter Samuelson &
Glushko]; see also Computer NetworksWebbed Fingers, supra note 4, at 86-87
(explaining ability of World Wide Web
technology to allow users to link physiremote documents).
cally
7
Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 6,
at 244.
'For example, the Boston University
Conditions of Use and Ethics Policy imposes certain standards of behavior on
users to prevent inappropriate conduct

on the network and includes a prohibition against the copying, distribution,
display or disclosure of third party proprietary software without the prior consent of the licensor.
9
Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 6,
at 244 (discussing "netiquette"). But see
Software Piracy, supra note 2 (software
piracy on Internet moving into courtroom).
'°See generally id. at 245, note 30 (Internet opening up to commercial services).
11
NII AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note
1, at 6 (private sector to lead deployment of NII); see also generally ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991)

(identifying conditions conducive to resort to social norms for dispute resolution; law more likely to matter when social distance between disputants increases, magnitude of stakes rises and
when legal system provides opportunity
for disputants to externalize costs to
third parties).
2
This article concentrates on the applicability of federal copyright law to
data traveling over Internet because
that law is likely to be the primary
source of rights for most of the data
traveling over the NIL. Although programs which may be uploaded and sent
over the Internet may be covered by
one or more patents, most of the text,
audio, and graphic images sent over
the Internet and eventually the NII are
likely to be governed primarily, if not
exclusively, by copyright. The importance of patents should not, however
be underestimated, as software patents
may block development of tools allowing users to manipulate data. Finally,
while trade secrets might be asserted in
valuable information traveling over a
network, much, if not most, of the information will probably be factual in
nature with the provider unlikely to
seek trade secret protection for it.
1317 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. IV
1993).
4
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
1Id. at 347-48. See also 17 U.S.C.
102(b) ("[i]n no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work."). For a good discussion of
policy reasons underlying rule against
copyrighting facts, seeJessica Litman,
The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965
(1990).

6

Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. See also 17
U.S.C. § 103(a) (subject matter of copyright includes compilations), 103(b)
(copyright in compilation extends only
to material contributed by author of
such work as distinguished from preexisting material) and § 101 ("A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection
and assembling of preexisting materials
or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship.... ").
'7Walter & Sussman, supra note 4, at
4.
18499 U.S. 340 (1991) (Court addressed copyrightability of alphabetical
white pages telephone directory, holding that selection, coordination and arrangement of data failed to meet originality standard described by Court as
constitutionally required.)
1
The database involved in the Feist
case was stored on a computer but this
fact did not play a part in the Court's
decision.
2017 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp.
IV
1993).
21

ld.

22

H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5665 ("[u]nder the bill it makes
no difference what the form, manner
or medium of fixation may be ...
whether embodied in a physical object
in . . . magnetic, or any other stable
form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device 'now known or later developed."')
[hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT].
23

See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982);
Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d
852 (2d Cir. 1982) (cases holding that
video games sufficiently fixed in chips
embodying game instructions even
though player interaction determines
particular
sequence of events).
24
Random Access Memory, or RAM,
is generally the memory available to the
user for running applications. RAM
may be either volatile (its contents are
lost when the hardware is powered off)
or non-volatile (its contents are retained when the hardware is powered
off). There seems to be a better case
for fixation in the case of non-volatile
RAM, in which the data are more likely
to be retained for a non-transitory time
period.
25
For example, users may "chat" with
each other in real-time by sending messages over the network. Generally, these
messages are stored in volatile RAM. If
the chat message or e-mail is stored in

the mail spool on the sender's network,
this storage would seem to meet the fixation requirement so long as it is of
more than transitory duration. The
harder cases arise when the storage in
the mail spool is fleeting or the data
moves immediately from the sender's
RAM to the recipient's network or
RAM.
26991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed,
114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
27
Id. at 518.
28
d.
29
The case addressed not the question of copyright eligibility for data in
RAM but whether or not the software
loaded into RAM from disk infringed
the copyright of the program stored on
disk. Under the Copyright Act, the concepts of "fixation" and "copies" are related. Fixation is a threshold requirement for copyright protection and a
work is "fixed" when it is embodied in a
"copy." Thus, if the software loaded
in
RAM constituted a "copy" for infringement purposes, presumably it would
also be considered "fixed" for copyright
eligibility purposes. Under the court's
reasoning, which noted Peak's ability to
load the software into RAM and derive
useful work from it in problem diagnosis, the case for copyrightability may be
more persuasive with regard to e-mail
and bulletin board exchanges, which
are probably extensively edited and manipulated through a text editor, than
chat, which is composed and sent in
real-time.
3017 U.S. C. § 101 (work "fixed"
when
embodiment by or under authority of
author). It would seem then that nontransitory storage in the recipient system's mail spool would satisfy the fixation requirement because such storage
is impliedly authorized by the sender.
Note also, however, that section 101
states that a work consisting of sounds,
images, or both, that is being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of the Act if
a fixation is made simultaneously with
its transmission. If this requirement is
applied to e-mail type data, the question would arise as to whether the fixation in the recipient mail spool occurs
simultaneously with the transmission
from the sender. It seems likely that if
the data is not stored for more than a
transitory time on the sending system
in RAM or in the sending system's mail
spool and thus fixed, the storage in the
recipient system's mail spool is likely to
occur at virtually the same time as the
sender's transmission. Cf. National
Football League v. McBee & Bruno's,
Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986).
3117 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) - (8)
(works
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of authorship include literary works,
musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,
motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, sound recordings and architectural works); see also, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §
106 (public performance rights accorded audiovisual works but not sound
recordings).
32
Id. at § 101 ("'Literary works' are
works, other than audiovisual works,
expressed in words, numbers, or other
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia,
regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as . . . tapes, disks, or
in which they are embodied.").
cards,
33
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22 at
5667 ("term 'literary works' . . . in... computer data bases").
cludes
34
See, e.g., Lane v. Nat'l Bank of
Boston, 687 F.Supp. 11, 16 (D. Mass.
1988), aff'd, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir.
1989).
3-1 7 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("[W]orks of authorship include the following cate.... ") (emphasis added).
gories
36
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22 at
5664 - 65 (history of copyright law one
of gradual expansion in types of works
protected as technological developments make new forms of creative expression possible or works in existence
for generations gradually recognized as
creative and worthy of protection. New
expressive forms may fall into one of
two categories: (1) extensions of copyrightable subject matter Congress already intended to protect and thus considered copyrightable from outset without need of new legislation (e.g., electronic music and computer programs);
or (2) subject matter requiring statutory enactment for protection (photographs, sound recordings and motion
pictures)). It seems likely that since the
components of mixed media works are
probably all within one of the already
existing statutory subject categories,
such works would be viewed as a new
expressive form enabled by technology
but which Congress already intended to
protect. Cf. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

2.03[Al (1993) [hereinafter

NIMMER

NIMMER].
37

&

This article does not address the
issue of how such mixed-media works
should be classified under the existing
statute. Should a mixed-media work be
divided into its components with each
component treated according to its
subject matter category? Should one
governing category be selected and, if
so, on what basis? See generally, U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY As-
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SESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER
SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE CHALLENGE Or TECHNOLOGICAL

172-73 (1992) [hereinafter
OTA
REPORT].
3
'Those rights are set forth in section
106 of the Copyright Act and, in the
case of literary works, include the rights
to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies, prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work, distribute
copies of the copyrighted work, and
perform or display the copyrighted
work
publicly.
39
See Samuelson & Glushko, supra
note 6, at 237-38 (discussing success of
copyright in hard copy world in accommodating expectations of both authors
and public).
40NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, at
5.04.
4
id., at note 3. (Limited inspection
by others not constituting general publication may be prevented by author
only where basis for establishing confidential relationship between parties regarding subject matter or contract between
parties precluding inspection).
42
]d. (Note also that Nimmer states
that recipient of letter entitled to permit distribution or display thereof by library. This raises interesting questions
for e-mail. If recipient of hard copy letter may donate copy to library and
thereby allow others to view it, may recipient of e-mail upload it to electronic
library? Answer may turn on interpretation of 109(c) of Copyright Act which
states that owner of copy or any person
authorized by owner entitled to display
copy publicly to viewers present at
place where copy located. In cyberspace, viewers not physically located
at place where copy is but could be reas present in virtual sense.).
garded
43
This assumes, of course, that forwarding the note electronically creates
a copy. Based on the statutory definition of "copies," the statutory provisions on fixation and the analysis of the
eligibility of digital data for copyright
protection, all as set forth supra at text
accompanying notes 20-30, it seems
likely that the forwarded message
would be considered a "copy" under
the Copyright Act. Generally, the forwarded message will be stored in RAM,
a mail spool or on disk for more than
transitory duration, with the sender
keeping a copy of the original message
and the forwarded one. It may also be
the case that the act of forwarding the
note to a large number of users who
were not copied on the original note
might also or alternatively be analyzed
as an infringement of the copyright
CHANGE,

holder's exclusive rights to distribute
and/or display the copyrighted work
publicly. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 56.
""A 'derivative work' is a work based
upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a[n] ...abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed or adapted.
A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole represent an original work of authorship, is a
'derivative work.'" 17 U.S.C. § 101.
1517 U.S.C. § 204(a) (transfer of
copyright ownership not valid unless in
writing); § 101 (definition of "transfer
of copyright ownership" includes exclusive46 license).
0f course, the question would then
arise as to whether or not in the act of
adding comments to the original note,
the addressee has become a joint author of it. This seems unlikely because
joint authorship requires an intent that
the parties be joint authors at the time
the work was created (17 U.S.C. § 101).
More difficult questions ofjoint authorship are likely to arise in electronic conferences in which many people contribute to an electronic discussion
group about a particular topic of interest.47
Cf American Inst. of Architects v.
Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147 (S.D.N.Y
1941) (where plaintiff put book of
forms on general market, he implied
right to their private use because of intrinsic nature of book of forms); similarly, it would seem that where the
copyright holder sends out an electronic communication, he impliedly authorizes the recipient to reply to it by incorporating it by reference and using
the same medium of transmission.
4
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
- S. Ct. __
1994 WL 64738, citing
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990);
see also infra text accompanying notes
73 - 75 for discussion of theoretical
basis for fair use doctrine.
49
Id. (clarifying that commercial use
not presumptively unfair).
50
Generally, a finding of author consent is not required to excuse otherwise
infringing conduct under fair use (3
NIMMER & NIMMER 13.05). However, the
fact that the author expects the addressee to engage in the allegedly infringing conduct would probably be relevant.
51
Cf Samuelson & Glushko, supra
note 6, at 244 -45.
52
Generally, the usual bulletin board
operates in one of three ways. The host
system operating the board may receive

postings from subscribers on a particular topic and (1) automatically send the
postings out to all who have subscribed
to the topic; or (2) send the postings
out to subscribers at their request; or
(3) adopt an approach combining (1)
and (2). Thus, in a particular case, one
or more of the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder may be implicated, including the rights to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies, to distribute copies to the public and to display
the copyrighted work publicly.
53
That is, the conduct again is noncommercial in nature and within the expectations of the poster. The more difficult question in this context may be that
ofjoint authorship (see supra note 46).
5417 U.S.C. § 107 (comment, criticism and research among nonexclusive
examples set forth in statute of categories of conduct intended to be protected by fair use; other examples include news reporting, teaching and
scholarship).
5
1 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,
839 E.Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
56Id. (subscriber uploaded computer
graphic files containing Playboy photos;
other subscribers could access and
download photos; fair use defense of
bulletin board operator rejected when
(1)use clearly commercial since bulletin
board operator charged for access to system even though customers used materials for personal use; (2) copyrighted
work one of fantasy and entertainment
entitled to broad scope of protection;
(3) photos essential part of copyrighted
work; and (4) market for copyrighted
work likely to be adversely affected. Bulletin board operator's lack of knowledge
of infringing conduct by subscriber not
defense to infringement but may go to
damages).
57
See Software Piracy, supra note 2;
MIT Student Called Software Piracy Plotter,
supra note 2 (note that in case of MIT
student, case for liability may be somewhat stronger than in PEI since MIT
student as bulletin board operator ostensibly knew of infringing conduct of
subscribers); Highway Robbery, supra
note 2 (freelance writers suing newspapers, magazine company and electronic
information providers for copyright infringement; music publisher suing in
class action for distribution of digitized
songs on CompuServe bulletin board).
58
AOL is probably seeking to preserve a cause of action for breach of
contract against the subscriber who uploads copyrighted material without permission of the copyright owner. AOL
would thus have a basis against which
to seek recovery of damages which it

may be required to pay to the copyright
owner under the PEIrationale.
59
See, generally,Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965
(1990).
6
it is questionable though whether
this is necessary. The benefits of electronic communication include the ability to contact virtually anyone quickly
and effectively without much expense.
Thus, the transaction costs that in part
gave rise to clearinghouses like ASCAP
and BMI (see generally Broadcast Music
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441
U.S. 1 (1979) for explanation of ASCAP
and BMI operation) should not be as
steep in the electronic context. Publishers could, for example, make available
one id on the network to handle permission requests. For more centralized
administration, groups of publishers
might prefer an ASCAP-type clearinghouse. Another alternative might be for
the clearinghouse to be publicly rather
than privately administered.
61
Again, because the conduct is noncommercial in nature and within the
expectations of the publisher, the implied license or fair use doctrine should
shelter it despite the fact that it involves
wholesale
copying.
62
See supra note 4.
"See William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18J. LEGAL STUDIEs 325 (1989).
"4 See OTA REPORT, supra note 37, at
177 (some argue no solution to problem of unauthorized copying and problem so grave electronic publishing will
never thrive as industry). It should be
noted however, that the same view has
historically attended every advance in
copying technology.
'5Id. (one option to assign intelligent
software agents to job of representing
copyright owner by recording all uses
of information, including whether information incorporated into derivative
work, and then applying appropriate
charges). See also, Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 6, at 247 - 55 (describing
proposed "Xanadu" system under
which users could link documents from
participating authors and system would
assess charges based on bytes linked).
66
Cf Samuelson & Glushko, supra
note 6, at 252 - 53(noting that Xanadu
model resembles compulsory license
system rather than exclusive rights system). See also generally Teresa Riordan,
Fee Plan to Share On-Line Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1994, D, at 1, 6 (Dialog
Information Systems Inc. announcing
new fee structure based on number of
authorized users of documents in attempt to appropriate revenue from

copies shared by subscribers) [hereinafter Fee Plan] .
67See supranote 61.
68
See Samuelson & Glushko, supra
note 6, at 251 - 52 (Xanadu system may
undermine both fair use and section
102(b) idea/expression distinction);
but see OTA REPORT, supra note 37, at
177 (software could be programmed either to apply charges or to send request
for relief from charges). Perhaps the
problem could be solved by requiring a
clause in the provider-subscriber contract requiring relief to be given when
the subscriber's use would be considered "fair" under the Copyright Act.
This would, however, be difficult to administer reliably as the scope of fair use
depends, at least in part, both on the
data and the use to which the data is
put. Because, as a technical matter, the
bits of data on a magnetic medium appear interchangeable, it would be difficult to accommodate the differing
scope of fair use by attaching different
charges to different combinations of
bits of data.
69
See, e.g., Computer Associates Int'l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1992) (trade secret action not preempted where it states extra elementbreach of confidential relationship-in
addition to copying).
70
See Nat'l Car Rental System v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426
(8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
176 (1993) (breach of alleged contractual restriction on use of licensed programs constitutes extra element in addition to copyright rights such that action is not preempted); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 E.2d 923 (4th
Cir. 1988) (cause of action based on implied contractual provision not arising
out of subject matter of copyright states
distinct cause of action not preempted
by copyright law). But see Wolff v. Institute of Elec. & Elec. Eng'rs, Inc., 768 F.
Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (breach of
contract action preempted where
breach based on same conduct as that
infringing copyright); See also 1 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 36, at 1.01 [B]
(criticizing Wolff decision as erroneous).
711 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
36,
at 1.01 [B] [3], at n.257, citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see
also WendyJ. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 156
at n.22 (1992) (inquiry into whether
state law interferes with congressional
intentions should survive existence of
section 301) [hereinafter Intellectual
Property and the RestitutionaryImpulse] .
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1 See

David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private.Contract and Public Policy: Federal
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions
Against Reverse Engineering,53 U. PITT.
L. REV. 543, 546 (1992) (limitation of
copyright rights reflects that copyright
is exception to policy against monopoly
and even limited monopoly restricts use
of 73
information by others).
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601
(1982) (fair use concerned with cases
in which (1) defendant couldn't purchase desired use through market; (2)
transferring control over use to defendant would serve public interest; and
(3) copyright owner's incentives would
not be substantially impaired by allowing74use to proceed).
See supra text accompanying notes
71-74.
7
1See supra text accompanying notes
14-17.
76
This "thinner" scope of protection
is a direct result of the holding in the
Feist case, set forth supra note 18. That
case is perhaps one of the most extensively analyzed in history, with a substantial literature discussing the theoretical underpinnings of its holdings as
well as its practical implications. For a
listing of a number of articles assessing
the case, see Paolo Cerina, The Originality Requirement in the Protectionof Databases in Europe and the United States, 5 IIC:
INT'L Rvw. OF INDUS. PROPERTY & CopyRIGHT LAW 579, 589, note 71 (1993).
For a good discussion of the search for
principled analysis in misappropriation
type cases, see Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 71.
77For example, a publisher may recoup its investment in the underlying
database through charges for the copyrighted search and retrieval software
that allows a subscriber to manipulate
the database.

7

SFor example, the WESTLAW Subscriber Agreement provides that a subscriber may use the data available to it
solely in the regular course of legal and
other research and related work. The
subscriber has a right to download and
temporarily store insubstantial portions
of data to a storage device under the
subscriber's exclusive control solely to
display the data internally and to quote
from it (appropriately cited and credited) in memoranda, briefs and similar
work product. The subscriber may also
create printouts of the data for internal
use and distribution to third parties
provided such third parties do not further distribute them. The subscriber
may not sell or license data to third parties or use data as a component of or
bases for any material offered for sale
or license. Moreover, the contract provides that fair use rights are permitted
only if they are not otherwise expressly
prohibited by the agreement. WESTLAW's database combines both copyrighted and public domain information
but the same terms ostensibly apply to
each and charges for downloading
apply regardless of what type of information is downloaded. It seems then
that WESTLAW has attempted to restrict the use of even the factual, public
domain information contained in its
database through the license grant
while also limiting the "fair" use of
copyrighted material. See also generally
Fee Plan, supra note 66.
79Section 301 preemption only applies to works which "come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified
by sections 102 and 103." Thus, if an
on-line fact based database is not sufficiently creative in its selection and arrangement of data, it may not be entitled to copyright protection and thus
outside the subject matter addressed by
301. SeeJane C. Ginsburg, No Sweat?
Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone,

92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 361 (1992) (addressing argument that exclusion of
facts and ideas from subject matter of
copyright states federal policy that
ideas free to be copied and states not
free to regulate).
°See Jeromne H. Rcichman, Electronic
Information Tools-The Outer Edge of
World Intellectual Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 797, 820-30 (1992) (suggesting that two-party deals are at odds
with public interest and discussing
need to conceptualize electronic information processing as special kind of industrial tool which may not fit within
classical intellectual property scheme,
suggesting that new law is required).
See also Ginsburg, supra note 79 (discussing possibility of federal misappropriation statute).
"For example, the European Community's Proposed Database Directive
provides generally for fifteen-year protection against unauthorized extraction
from a database for commercial purposes irrespective of whether the
database is eligible for copyright protection. Compulsory licenses are available in certain limited circumstances.
Copyright protection would continue
to be available for those databases that
meet the requirements (including originality) for copyright protection. (See
Database Directive Goes to Council Following its Amendment by Commission, 8
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT,

at 6 (1994); Commission Agrees to Lengthen Protection Period for Databases, 7
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT,

at 203 (1993); European Community Commission's Proposed DatabaseDirective, 6
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT,

at 105 - 109 (1992);See also Ginsburg,
supra note 79, at 367-84 (discussing
whether Congress has ability to legislate
under Commerce Clause to protect
databases unable to meet constitutional
standard of originality under PatentCopyright clause).
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BOOK REVIEWS

Abortion and the States: Political
Change and Future Regulation,
Jane B. Wishner, ed.; American
Bar Association, 1993. 345 pages,
$39.95 (paperback).

Reviewed by
Christopher C. Faille*

I

n the autumn of 1992, during

the vice-presidential debate,
Admiral James Stockdale made
the following statement: "A
woman owns her body and what she
does with it is her business." When
pressed for some further comment
on the issue of abortion rights, the
Admiral just said, "Period."
Constitutional law in the 1990s
does not, unfortunately, allow for
many "periods." Complexity, and, behind that, confusion, prevail in this
realm where the tranquil rest implied
in a "period" is a rare bird. The contemporary position of the Supreme
Court on the issue that seemed so
simple to Stockdale exemplifies this
complexity. A substantive reading of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, incorporating
the emanations and penumbra of the

various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, allows a woman the liberty to
obtain an abortion if she can overcome whatever regulatory barriers
her state has put in the way of her access to that procedure. The high
Court, meanwhile, has deputized the
federal district courts to determine,
in a manner perfectly ad hoc, which
barriers do or do not constitute "undue burdens."
That first became the law of the
land in July 1989, when the Court issued its decision in Webster v. Repro-

ductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989). In December of that year, the
Section of Urban, State, and Local
Government Law of the ABA and the
National Conference of State Legislatures held ajoint day-long symposium
to discuss the degree of latitude that
Webster had created for state regulation of abortion and the implications
of this decision for the future of the
basic abortion-rights precedent, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
That symposium planted the seed of
this book. But the editor, Jane Wishner, a one-time law clerk to the Honorable Abner Mikva of the Court of
Appeals, D.C. Circuit, saw fit to graft
on material that did not sprout from
that seed. Most notably, she has included in this volume two extensive
law review articles, one each from the
pro-life and the pro-choice camps.
The articles share one important
problem with the symposium materials-what one might best call their
pre-Caseyhood. Every contributor
seems to have assumed (and some argued quite explicitly) that Webster was
merely a transitional decision, and
that the pending appeal on Pennsylvania's abortion regulations would provoke an opinion overturning Roe outright. Some faced that prospect with
dread, others with hope. None imag-

ined anything akin to the Supreme
Court's latest abortion landmark, the
reaffirmation of both Webster and Roe
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.

Ct. 2791 (1992).
It is appropriate to describe the resulting volume as two-layered: confident pre-Casey predictions covered by
sheepish post-Casey explanations. The
first of the two law review articles
(Richard G. Wilkins et al., "Mediating
the Polar Extremes: A Guide to PostWebster Abortion Policy," which appears in the book as chapter 10) anticipates, although with many caveats
and much caution, a new framework
for abortion law and policy, one that
will allow for what they call "categorical prohibition, " i.e., the legislative
proscription of certain categories of
abortion as defined by purpose, particularly the proscription of abortion for
reason of convenience or sex selection. In the view of these two authors
and their medical consultant, Webster
opens the gates to a statute that will
"properly balance the conflicting demands of protecting fetal life and safeguarding maternal autonomy."
Whatever one thinks of their policy proposal, as a matter of predictive
accuracy, Wilkins et al. were wrong.
In an author's note composed after
the Casey decision, these scholars
admit that the body of their essay is
now "historical" in its interest, because that intervening precedent
has since "resolved much of the
speculation that surrounded the
drafting of the article."
What I miss in their note, and in
this volume generally, is any attempt
on the part of the contributors to determine just why they were all so surprised by Casey. Was it just another
proof that the Supreme Court is an
inherently unpredictable body-just
nine "wild and crazy guys" (and gals),
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like the characters created by Ackroyd- and Martin too many years ago?
Or was there something else at work,
some error in the way that legal
scholars today understand, or try to
understand, judicial practice?
The same question arises in connection with the other law review article included here (Rachel N. Pine &
Sylvia A. Law, "Envisioning a Future
for Reproductive Liberty: Strategies
for Making the Rights Real," which
appears in the book as chapter 11).
Despite its forward-looking title, this
essay, for the most part, looks back, in
the spirit of an elegy, at the long effort to defend Roe. The authors regard that effort as another item on a
list of the tactical failures of feminism, analogous to the non-ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.
Pine and Law pine for a lost principle
of law. They assert that "once Roe is
overturned ...

more, conveys no information that
one cannot obtain readily elsewhere.
But I cannot end this review without expressing a personal wish that
we, as a nation, will return to Roe and
start again, this time keeping in mind
Stockdale's succinct dictum, "a
woman owns her body and what she
does with it is her business. Period."
Perhaps, if we give ourselves another
chance, we can keep things almost
that simple. U

Bargaining with the State, by

Richard A. Epstein; Princeton
University Press, 1993. 322
pages, $35.

it will be many years

before the Federal Constitution may
again provide the basic protection for
reproductive rights."
Like their jurisprudential counterparts in chapter ten, the authors of
chapter eleven had to add a postCasey note. This proved, understandably, more upbeat than was the original article. For although Casey
trimmed back Roe a bit, or rather formalized and confirmed the respects
in which Webster had done so, Casey
also explicitly affirmed the central
holding of the 1973 precedent, in a
manner that Pine and Law find
"filled with surprises." But from these
scholars, as from their pro-life mirror
images, the reader receives no illumination as to why everybody's expectations for the death of Roe went so unfulfilled.
The dearth of analysis on that crucial point is only one of the considerations that leave me wondering why
anyone would buy this book-would
part with hard-earned money to acquire a slew of out-of-date essays, rehearsing tired arguments that have
long since lost any power they once
had to persuade anyone of the rightness of any side of the underlying
controversy-a volume that, furtherAugust 1994/Volume 41, No. 7
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Christopher C. Faille

whole body of his work

know, Professor Richard
Epstein
argues that
sthose familiar
withthere
the
is a right and wrong inherent in the
way the world works. The code he
finds in nature is simple to state-it
consists entirely of one great rule and
one crucial exception, both given explicit formulation in the preface of
this, his latest book.

A

The rule is that every human being is

autonomous. In Epstein's view, this
principle accounts for the acquisition
of private property, the enforcement
of freely exchanged promises, the
compensation of harms to one person caused by the activities of another, and for the existence of a minimal
state-that is, of such organized public force as may protect the liberty
and property of one autonomous person from invasion by others. The crucial exception to the rule is that
morality may allow forced exchange,

where necessity prevails and on condition ofjust compensation.

Taxation, insofar as it is requisite to
fund even the minimal state, is warranted under this exception for necessity with compensation. Every coerced citizen has his autonomy to a
degree compromised, but is intrinsically compensated because the extorted funds are used to protect that
same citizen's person and property
from predators (from "other" predators, the disgruntled tax protestor
might nonetheless mutter). In many
other cases, state action hurts some
small circle of individuals and benefits a broader public, as when eminent domain is employed to take a
family's home and clear the route for
a superhighway. Here, the final clause
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, known as the takings clause,
coincides with Epstein's notions of
morality, and so requires fair payment for the objects of necessity.
That coincidence of requirements
inspired Epstein's 1985 treatise, Takings,' in which he argued that any legislation or regulation that touches on
voluntary exchange or property
rights and alters the common-law
framework for such exchanges and
rights is a "taking." Any such state action, then, is immoral if unnecessary.
Even if necessary, it is still violative of
the law of nature insofar as it goes uncompensated. If the constitutional
clause is read in accord with this
philosophical inference, a state will
only regulate the economy in circumstances in which the implied takings
pay for themselves-that is, when the
projects have positive utility. It will
not regulate merely to shift wealth
from the rich to the poor.
But "once the New Deal has been
declared unconstitutional ... it is hard

to do it a second time," Epstein wryly
observes. So, in this latest volume, his
argument takes a new turn. Suppose
jurisprudential libertarians of Epstein's sort realize that they cannot
outlaw the welfare state, or, at any rate,
won't succeed in doing so next week.
What should they do then? What is
"second best," in Epstein's words, in
securing a wide domain of autonomy
even in a country in which the state's

monopoly, taxing, and spending powers are all much over-used?
Although only a small circle of
legal scholars, and an even smaller
number of practitioners outside of
the academy, share the philosophical/jurisprudential premises Epstein
lays out in his preface, many share his
concerns and will learn from the particulars of his discussion in this valuable book, as he attempts to "impose
limits on the power of the state to
bargain with its citizens," i.e., to impose conditions on the acceptance of
government benefits or privileges.
In the first chapter, Epstein observes that Associate Justice Joseph
Bradley recognized a limit on the bargaining power of the state in 1876. In
that year, the Supreme Court upheld
the power of a state to license a foreign corporation to do business within its borders only on the condition
that the corporation waive its rights
to federal diversity jurisdiction.2 Justice Bradley wrote in dissent:
Though a state may have the
power, if it sees fit, to subject its

citizens to the inconvenience of
prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business
within its jurisdiction, it has no
power to impose unconstitutional
conditions upon their doing so. 3
Much of Epstein's book is an extended defense of the thought that
even when a state may, without constitutional question, deny a license,
refuse permission for an activity, or
rescind a grant or entitlement, it may
nonetheless be unconstitutional for a
state to demand the waiver of a constitutional right as a condition of the license, permission, grant, or entitlement.
Popular wisdom says, "He who pays
the piper, calls the tune." Many jurists
agree. Sometimes they add, "He who
has the authority to silence the piper,
also calls the tune." Chief Justice
Rehnquist is one of those. Rehnquist
argued, in a 1986 decision, that Puerto Rico can permit the operation of a
gambling casino on the condition
that the casino owners refrain from

on-island advertising. One of the justifications Rehnquist offered was that,
because the Commonwealth has the
power to ban casinos outright, it has
the power to place conditions on
their operation-the greater power
implies the lesser.4 It is good to focus
on Posadas,which is much more typical of the recent and contemporary
issues Epstein wants to reach than is a
nineteenth-century decision on the
scope of federal diversity jurisdiction.
On his first mention of Posadas,
early in his book, Epstein does not
reach the substance of Rehnquist's
argument, but he does observe that
the terminology of "greater" and
"lesser" is misleading: "[I]f the state
has the greater power to punish both
blacks and whites [for a given crime],
then it has the lesser power to punish
only blacks or only whites. Although
such cases [of selective enforcement]
do not give rise to an unconstitutional conditions problem as that term is
used here, the greater/lesser language is still applicable."
Later, in another context, Epstein
describes the legislation at issue in
Posadas as "an attempt by Puerto Rico
to exploit those within its borders....
When the state seeks to divide markets-with local customers directed
toward the state's own lottery and
well-heeled, out-of-state customers toward its posh casinos-it looks as if
the anti-competitive motives dominate the protective motives."
Given this reading of the statute,
Epstein concludes that the Court
should have required "the bundling
of these two issues-casino gambling
and casino advertising-in order to
forestall the political abuse that
threatens commercial speech."
In other words, Epstein believes
that jurists should force upon legislators an all-or-nothing choice: gambling with advertising or no gambling
at all. Likewise, a corporate license
with federal diversity rights or no license at all. Contrary to Rehnquist, a
legislature's power to tear apart such
a "bundle" is greater than, and so not
included within, the power to take or
leave the whole.

Yet Epstein does not believe that
every condition is unconstitutitnal.
For example, he supports the judgment of the Supreme Court in Wyman v. James,5 which upheld state legislation that conditioned welfare payments upon recipient consent to social worker interviews or inspections,
even when such inspections would
otherwise constitute unconstitutional
warrantless searches. The conditions
here, Epstein thinks, were reasonable
on balance, and "no different from
those which a private lender exacts
when it demands the right to inspect
the borrower's books and to audit its
plant and operation... !"
Sometimes, Epstein's balancing of
the competing interests he finds at
stake in a particular regulatory
scheme can take an unexpected turn.
In Rust v. Sullivan,6 for example, the
Supreme Court upheld regulations
under Title X of the Public Health
Act,7 which prohibits the use of federal funds "in programs where abortion
is a method of family planning." The
regulation at issue held that "a Title X
project may not provide counselling
concerning the use of abortion as a
method of family planning or provide
referral for abortion as a method of
family planning."'
For simplicity's sake, I will abstract
from Epstein's interesting discussion
of the issues of statutory interpretation raised in Rust. In time, Epstein
comes, as the Court did, to the constitutional issue. Did the regulation violate the First Amendment rights of
program participants? The Court, by
Justice Rehnquist, said no, roughly
on paying-the-piper grounds.
Epstein argues that the statute, as
applied, violates the First Amendment,
in that "program participants... find
themselves muffled by an abhorrent
administrative ukase." On the other
hand, he continues, any other application of the disputed provision of this
statute is also bound to violate the
First Amendment, for example by violating the free-speech rights of that
part of the public which is coerced
into funding speech that, in its own
eyes, advocates the murder of babies.
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Does Epstein urge, then, that to
avoid what he sees as an impossible
dilemma, government must withdraw
from the field of family planning and
counselling altogether? Not quite.
This is, after all, a book on libertarian
second bests, one which takes the
welfare state as a sociological given.
Such a state does have an interest in
"reducing the human and financial
costs of illegitimate children," Epstein concedes. But he proposes that
government cease the subsidy of family counselling from the treasury, or
at the discretion of public officials. Its
interests might best be served, without the need for any "abhorrent...
ukase," by a change in the tax laws to
provide a charitable deduction for
contributions to privately-run counselling centers.
Epstein's summary of the constitutional advantages of a tax break over
an administered subsidy also sets out
succinctly the two focal points of his
argument throughout this book:

U
The Lawyer's Almanac 1994: A
Complete Reference to Vital Facts
and Figures About the Legal Profes-

sion; Prentice Hall Law & Business, 1994. 1,318 pages, $95.

Reviewed by Henry Cohen*

T

his
editionconof
The fourteenth
Lawyer's Almanac
tains, in one fat volume, in-

formation about the 500
largest law firms and fifty largest corporate legal departments, the continuing education rules of the thirty-nine
states that have mandatory CLE, 1992

Any group, regardless of its position on abortion, can raise funds
for the program, so the bargaining
risk is controlled. Similarly, the
takings risk is moderated because
each group receives a matching
federal grant only to the extent
that it can obtain citizen contributions for its positions.
Whether Professor Epstein is right
or wrong, on this as on much else, he
is usually provocative, often fascinating, and invariably scholarly. Furthermore, it ought to be possible to build
a political consensus on this book's
final words. Given that consensus,
much will require reconsideration
that now goes unchallenged:
Government and statecraft are always a high-risk enterprise, and
bargaining by the state has to be
watched as closely, and with the
same level of concern and suspicion, as taking, regulation, and
taxation-the traditional forms of
government power. LI

1R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERT

AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

(1985).
'Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co.,
94 3U.S. 535 (1876).
Id. at 543. In time, the Court came
around to the dissenter's view. Terral v.
Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529,
overturned Doyle in 1922. Epstein explains Terral thus: "The justification for
this result is identical to that applied in
the discriminatory tax cases. Foreign
corporations presumably want access to
federal courts to escape the local bias
of state courts. To prevent them from
exercising this option is to subject them
to a disguised differential tax equal to
their estimated additional burdens of
litigating in a hostile forum."
4
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
5400 U.S. 309 (1971).
6500 U.S. 173 (1991).
7
Pub. L. No. 91-572, § 6(c), 84 Stat.
1508 (1970), codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988).
842 C.F.R. § 59.8 (a) (1) (1991).

bar admissions, law schools, state bar
associations, federal and state judges,
federal and state agency officials,
where to write for vital records, and
more.
The book focuses on the practical,
rather than the biographical or
historical; thus, the information it
provides about judges and government officials is their names, addresses, and phone numbers, rather than

question is whether this book contains
useful information not found in Martindale-Hubbell (M-H). Well, it tells at a
glance how many partners and associates are in each firm, whereas in M-H
you would have to count the names to
know. It reports how many of the part-

personal data. It has no information

does not make such distinctions. Also,
whereas M-H merely lists each firm's
areas of concentration, the Almanac
specifies the percentage of the firm's
work devoted to each area.
Finally, the Almanac, unlike M-H,
reports the number of associates
hired and the number of partners
named by each firm in 1992, the
starting salary for associates, and the
billing rate for associates, partners,
and paralegals. In short, The Lawyers
Almanac 1994 is to be recommended
for, among others, recent graduates
who are sufficiently masochistic or
greedy to want to work for one of the
500 largest law firms. Q

about laws, except, inexplicably, summaries of state motorist liability laws
and chemical test laws, and a chart,
prepared by the National Rifle Association, of state laws governing handguns. Also inexplicably, the summaries and chart fail to include statutory citations. Yet this can be written
off, as the summaries and chart take
up less than thirty pages out of the

more than 1,300 in the book.
The feature of the book that takes
up the most space-over 400 pages
-is the information about the 500
largest law firms; each firm gets a half
page or full page to itself. The obvious
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ENDNOTES

ners and associates are women,
African-Americans, Hispanics, and

Asian-Americans (these are the book's
terms for these groups), whereas M-H
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